Relativists and anti-relativists alike are nowadays mostly united in considering Wittgenstein an epistemic relativist. 1 Accordingly, 2 there could be, either in principle or as a matter of fact, different epistemic systems, none of which would be intrinsically correct; each of them would be, from a metaphysical point of view, as good as any other one, and would certify as (true and) justified different propositions. As a consequence, knowledge -that is, justified true belief -, if and when attained, would always be situated: what counts as knowledge within one system of justification may not be so within another. Moreover, should alternative epistemic systems compete with each other, the choice couldn't be based on rational considerations, for it is only within each system that reasons and justifications are produced. Hence, the passage from one epistemic system to another would always be a form of conversion or persuasion, reached through a-rational means.
and symmetry, viz. the fact that certain kinds of explanations are less complex than others and can be extended from one domain to other, different ones (See OC 92, 262, 612) .
In connection with this theme, also the passages in which Wittgenstein says that "the propositions describing our world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology" (OC 95, cf. 97) may be taken to support the view that no rational foundation can be given to our system of justification and suggest that just as we no longer believe in Homer's gods, so one day we might replace our system of justification with other ones, should we wish or need to do so.
In the following I will try to motivate the view that once we look closer at these and other passages, the first impression of dealing with an epistemic relativist should be dramatically revised. As I will suggest, there is room for maintaining that Wittgenstein was merely an anti-foundationalist: he believed that our world-picture is ungrounded and that it isn't a mere reflection of a (totally) mindindependent reality. But anti-foundationalism is a long way short from relativism, let it be "factual" -the view according to which there actually are different, incompatible epistemic systems that are all equally valid -; or merely "virtual" -that is, the view according to which there could be, at least in principle, different, equally valid, and incompatible epistemic systems, all in fact conceivable from our own stand-point. 3 For simply to say that our world-picture is ungrounded doesn't entail either that there actually are different ones, or -more contentiously -that there could intelligibly be other ones, at least in principle.
Was Wittgenstein a naturalist?
Let us therefore start by considering so-called "naturalist" readings of Wittgenstein (Strawson 1985) . Although it is absolutely beyond doubt that he claimed both that the foundations of our language games are neither true, nor false, justified or unjustified, rational or not rational and that he wanted to regard our trust in them "as a form of life" and "as something animal" (OC 358, 359) , 3 These labels can be found in Marconi (1987, 122-4) . I disagree with Marconi in considering anti-foundationalism a "mild" form of relativism. Relativism is committed at least to the possibility of there being different and incompatible, though still intelligible systems of justification, whereas anti-foundationalism isn't.
3 he also claimed that this "is very badly expressed and probably badly thought as well" (OC 358).
One reason to think so is that in On Certainty Wittgenstein was trying to find a "third way" alternative to scepticism as well as to G. E. Moore's philosophy of common sense. 4 But, on reflection, it is quite obvious that naturalism would be no alternative to the former (Coliva 1999 (Coliva , 2007 (Coliva , 2009b . For no sceptic would deny that we act and live unassailed by doubts regarding our most basic beliefs, and that we should discard sceptical doubts if we want to pursue our daily activities. Still, a sceptic would insist that, despite their ineffectuality in everyday life, his doubts show that we simply don't have, nor can we produce any justification for our most basic beliefs. So naturalism, far from being an alternative to scepticism, would simply be its logical consequence.
Wittgenstein, however, thought that our most basic beliefs are neither justified, nor, as a matter of fact, justifiable. Take a hinge such as "The Earth has existed for a long time". Everything we regard as evidence in geology, archaeology, history, etc., speaks in favour of that claim (OC 183, 188, 190, 203, 234 ). Yet, all this would count as evidence in favour of that proposition only if that very cornerstone is not called into doubt (cf. OC 337, . For suppose someone doubted that the Earth had existed for a long time and surmised instead that we and everything else around us had just popped into existence. It would be immediately evident that those rocks, fossils, and documents we now regard as evidence in favour of the very long existence of the Earth would lose their status, as their existence would be compatible with the fact that they first appeared a few minutes ago (OC 236, cf. also 301). So, as a matter of fact, any grounds we might want to produce for "The Earth has existed for a long time" presuppose taking for granted that the Earth has existed for a long time and cannot, therefore, be used to justify it. That is to say, those pieces of evidence can be used within the specific project of settling the question of how long the Earth has been existing for, but they can't be used as justifications for the generic belief that the Earth has existed for a long time.
4 There is widespread agreement on this (a notable exception is Fogelin, in conversation), although there is disagreement on whether such a third way should be constructive -i.e. a positive theory -or merely negative -i.e. a dissolution of the erroneous representations which led to scepticism and to Moore's position. Hence, it is correct to say that our most basic beliefs are not grounded or justified, for, as we have just seen, they can't be grounded or justified. But now, does it follow that they aren't rationally held? It would if rational acceptance were just acceptance on the basis of reasons and warrants.
Indeed, such a conclusion would tally with Wittgenstein's remark that our most basic beliefs aren't rational and that our acceptance of them is "something animal", which hints, obviously, at a kind of acceptance that is independent of reasons, as it is brute and instinctive, or, at least, simply rooted in our upbringing within a certain community. But it may be suggested -to rectify that very impression, which Wittgenstein himself seemed to be dissatisfied with -that he was working with too narrow a conception of rationality. ), held because we have been brought up within a certain form of life, can be seen as rationally mandatory, even if it is not supported by evidential warrants, if what is so believed is a cornerstone of one or more of our language games as it makes possible for us to have those disciplines within which reasons for and against specific empirical propositions can be produced.
It is worth-noticing in this respect that at OC 342 Wittgenstein writes: "it belongs to the logic (italics mine) of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted" and that at OC 56 and 150 he adds: "Everything descriptive of a language game is part of logic" and "somewhere I must begin with not-doubting; and that is not, so to speak, hasty but excusable: it is part of judging" (italics mine). For, clearly, he is saying that the hinges of our language games are part of logic (in the extended sense that this term has in Wittgenstein's later writings). Hence, they are part of the system in which reasons are produced and within which our notion of rationality has a home. Of course they are not within the system as genuine empirical propositions we can provide 5 Cf. Coliva (2009b) . Wright (2004) thinks that Wittgenstein was working with too narrow a notion of warrant. Should warrants comprise also non-evidential ones, as Wright holds, our acceptance of the hinges of our epistemic system would turn out to be rational. I discuss Wright's position extensively in my (2007, 2009b) .
6 The difference between belief and acceptance is that the former but not the latter is based on (defeasible) evidence. In the following I will use the words interchangeably, because, for present purposes, it doesn't really make any difference.
It should also be noticed that acceptances may not be explicit (cf. Coliva 2009b). 5 reasons for are. Still, they aren't outside the system either. As I have suggested elsewhere (Coliva 2007 (Coliva , 2009b , they might be seen as lying at the limit of the system -as they are its conditions of possibility -and hence as fully rational, even if unsupported by reasons.
Moreover, it merits note that this wouldn't be an arbitrary extension of our ordinary notion of (epistemic) rationality. To see this, consider that not to accept what lies at the foundation of our various systems of justification would deprive us of them, and therefore of the possibility of producing reasons for or against any empirical proposition. In turn, this would leave us without the very notion of epistemic rationality. For such a notion depends on the practice of producing reasons for and against empirical propositions. Hence, it is constitutive of epistemic rationality that we accept what makes it possible, even if it can't be supported by reasons.
On such a notion of rationality, which, I claim, is of Wittgensteinian descent, it would be mistaken to think, with Moore, that our basic beliefs amount to knowledge, as no justification can be given for them. Conversely, it would be mistaken to hold, with the sceptic as well as with the naturalist, that they aren't rationally taken for granted and held merely as an effect of nature or of our upbringing within a community that shares various a form of life. The latter may be the genealogy of our acceptance, yet this shouldn't prevent us from recognising its intrinsic rationality.
So, suppose I am right in thinking that Wittgenstein wasn't a naturalist and should best be seen as an "internal rationalist" as we might put it. This, alas, wouldn't make a substantive difference with respect to the issue of his alleged relativism. For if the rationality of taking for granted certain propositions were, in effect, a function of the role they play within our system of justification, it would still be possible at least to conceive of different systems of justification with their own hinges, that would be rational from their own point of view. The only difference with respect to more usual forms of relativism would be that, on the present proposal, the hinges of each of these other systems would be certified as rational from the standpoint of those who adopt them, instead of being grounded in something a-rational, such as an instinct, or a form of life.
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In order to dig deeper, then, we should further inquire into the notion of alternative world-pictures.
To such an end, it will prove useful to distinguish between factual and virtual forms of relativism.
Was Wittgenstein a factual epistemic relativist?

Different hinges and theories
It is a striking feature of On Certainty that among the various hinges Wittgenstein listed "Nobody has ever been on the Moon", as this proposition is no longer a hinge and appears to our minds as on a par with "The Sun moves around the Earth", which is simply a false scientific statement. But are different hinges and scientific theories enough to ground the idea that we are dealing with different systems of justification which can't be argued for or against on rational grounds? So, it is perfectly conceivable that within just one system of justification -call it "Science" for short -people may have different beliefs, depending on the quantity and quality of the evidence available to them. Moreover, it is a striking feature of Science that as evidence piles up people engaging in it would tend to converge on certain beliefs. This suggests that there is just one system of justification -Science -which evolves and develops over time, where certain propositions and theories may be outdated by others, because new information comes in and actually proves certain beliefs or theories false, or calls for a new kind of explanation. But even in this latter case, where a change of "paradigm" occurs, it should be kept in mind that it is the presence of new evidence, which is recalcitrant to being incorporated within a given theory, that calls for a new explanation and hence for a new scientific model. So, at these critical moments in the history of science, one may be more 7 Let me point out that there are differences among the various hinges that Wittgenstein considers (see also MoyalSharrock 2004, ch. 7) . Here I will discuss the only one he listed that is now actually false, as it may at least offer a prima facie case for a relativistic interpretation of his thought.
8 For the purposes of this paper, I shall ignore the fact that some people doubt that that enterprise ever took place. 7 slowly persuaded to adopt the new theory than another, being perhaps more cautious or just biased.
All the same, sooner or later scientists will converge on the new theory because of evidence in its favour and of its greater explanatory and predictive power. Of course one day the new theory may fall into disrepute, but, if it does, it will do so because further new evidence will have come in.
Moreover, subjects are rationally persuaded to change their views only when specific empirical questions, which up to some point had no answer, are replied. So, scientific change is, after all, driven by rational considerations (which is not to say that there may not be other, non-rational ones: simply, the latter aren't as decisive as the former).
Interestingly, there are various passages at which Wittgenstein's considerations support precisely this view. For instance:
"But is there then no objective truth? Isn't it true, or false, that someone has been on the moon ?" If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the moon. Not merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our whole system of physics forbids us to believe it. For this demands answers to the questions "How did he overcome the force of gravity ?" "How could he live without an atmosphere ?" and a thousand others which could not be answered. But suppose that instead of all these answers we met the reply: "We don't know how one gets to the moon, but those who get there know at once that they are there; and even you can't explain Hence, it can be maintained that according to how Wittgenstein actually develops his points, rather than according to his prima facie more obvious pronouncements, it is only when entirely rational 8 considerations militate against "Nobody has ever been on the Moon" that that proposition would cease to be a "hinge" and would become a genuinely empirical one, subject to truth and falsity.
Different methods I
Perhaps, in order to get a grip on the idea that there may actually be different systems of justification, we should look at cases where some people use Science and others use a seemingly different system of justification, such as Divination, where subjects form beliefs by using methods that don't rely on evidence, on the formation of hypotheses and on their testing. For instance, in order to know whether it is going to rain, some people cast oracles by inspecting animals' interiors.
With respect to these cases, Wittgenstein seems to have been a relativist, as he claimed that no rational conviction could be possible, only persuasion. (OC 262, 612 ).
Yet, I think this would be a poor case in favour of relativism. For looking at the way animals' interiors deteriorate could be an indicator of the humidity present in the air, hence a piece of empirical evidence suitable to the purpose at hand -no matter how poor and unreliable it may turn out to be. If that is right then Divination, once deprived of all its symbolic and religious elements, would just be a piece of, as it were, "primitive" Science. Hence, it can't be used to support the idea that we are actually confronted with a different system of justification, but only to maintain the view that our system of justification may evolve through time. This is, however, what Wittgenstein's following remark in the Notes on Frazer's "The Golden Bough" also points out:
The nonsense here is that Frazer represents these people as if they had a completely false (even insane) idea of the course of nature, whereas they only possess a peculiar interpretation of the phenomena. That is, if they were to write it down, their knowledge of nature would not differ fundamentally from ours.
Only their magic is different. (141).
To say that their knowledge of nature isn't fundamentally different from ours means to say that they are responsive to empirical evidence in forming their beliefs about the weather. Their ways of acquiring and treating such evidence may look "primitive" to us. But this would only support the 9 claim that their empirical methods are less developed than ours, not that their methods of formation of belief in this area are totally different from ours.
One might then object that leaving out the symbolic and religious elements is illegitimate.
Wittgenstein too in the Notes stressed their importance and criticised Frazer's methodology because he had tried to explain certain religious practices as forms of primitive and erroneous science. Yet, I
think that this observation, though correct, can't lend support to relativist interpretations of Wittgenstein's thought. For it is one thing to say that in order to understand different religious practices we can't ignore their symbolic elements and must, therefore, connect them, through family resemblance, to what we do, so that, by so doing, we can familiarise ourselves with them and abandon a grossly judgemental attitude, which would actually compromise anthropological research. Still, it is a totally different thing to say that, while doing epistemology, thus engaging in a (at least partially) normative enterprise, we can't judge their epistemic practices, taken as such, and deem them erroneous, or, at any rate, "primitive", if compared to ours, should they so be.
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A case in point, which can help illuminate the contrast, is that of those African tribes where, even nowadays, traditional healers survive alongside Western doctors and are routinely consulted (Ghiaroni 2007) , as well as the case of the Azande, described by Edward E. Evans-Pritchard, who admit that termites can consume the legs of granaries so that they sometimes suddenly fall down and thus injure people sitting underneath, while also invoking witchcraft to explain the calamity.
Evans-Pritchard himself (1937, 72) already noted that the Azande distinguish between how a certain phenomenon happens and why it does. Winch comes close to seeing that this may be due to the fact that two different notions of causality are at play, when he notices that our own "concept of causal influence is by no means monolithic" (1964, 38) . But he then goes on to write as if reasoning by "efficient causes" and by "final" ones -as we might put it -were mutually exclusive. Arguably, however, these two ways of reasoning are compatible, as they respond to different concerns human beings can have. This opens up the possibility of saying that our scientific attitude is more advanced 9 It is notable that in Culture and Value (72) Wittgenstein himself talks of superstition as a "false science". insofar as our account of efficient causes is better than theirs; while also maintaining that their magical practices aren't a sufficiently strong ground to motivate the idea that they embrace a different epistemic system. It remains, however, that we have either an unlike "magic" or that we have altogether given up on it, and on its attendant inquiry into final causes.
In effect, what we witness in the two cases just presented is simply the fact that Science is characterised by the indifference to final causes. For to explain, in Science, is to find out merely the efficient causes of phenomena. Moreover, that these attitudes are, at bottom, independent can explain the Azande's faith in oracles (as well as the attitude of members of contemporary African tribes of reverting to traditional medicine). As Evans-Pritchard remarks (1937, 194) , among the Azande there is widespread scepticism about the powers claimed by the witch-doctors. Nevertheless, they are routinely consulted to explain why something happened, or to see whether a given course of action might be fraught with mystical dangers and should thus be avoided. In contrast, many of us today have totally abandoned the religious attitude.
As I read Wittgenstein's Notes, however, all these elements are compatible with his views. Some telling passages, which are worth-citing in full, are these:
[N]o phenomenon is in itself particularly mysterious, but any of them can become so to us, and the characteristic feature of the awakening mind of man is precisely the fact that the phenomenon comes to have meaning for him. One could almost say that man is a ceremonial animal. That is, no doubt, partly wrong and partly nonsensical, but there is also something right about it. (129, italics mine).
But then it is nonsense for one to go on to say that the characteristic feature of these actions is the fact that they arise from faulty views about the physics of things. (Frazer does this when he says that magic is essentially false physics or, as the case may be, false medicine, technology, etc.). (ibid.)
Rather, the characteristic feature of ritualistic action is not at all a view, an opinion, whether true or false, although an opinion -a belief -can itself be ritualistic and part of a rite. (ibid., but see also 121, 123).
Here Wittgenstein is distinguishing between opinions and theories, on the one hand, and the symbolic and religious elements of a ritual, on the other. He claims that there is continuity between the opinions and theories of the "primitives" and ours, for, presumably, they evolve as possible answers to the same kind of questions. Yet, the symbolic and ritual elements differ and might 
Different methods II
Another example often discussed in this connection concerns the allegedly different logic used by the Azande. This too would be a case of an alternative epistemic method, since logic is what is used to connect beliefs and to draw conclusions from them. According to Evans-Pritchard (1937, 24) , the Azande believe that witchcraft transmits patrilineally. In particular, it is an "inherited physical trait, consisting of a substance in the belly called 'witchcraft-substance'" (Bloor 1976, 123) . Sometimes, however, they would deny that the son of a witch-doctor is a healer in his turn. According to Which (1964) , this shows that the Azande don't accept modus ponens and have thus a different logic. Such a conclusion, however, isn't mandatory. Evans-Pritchard himself argues that the "Azande do not perceive the contradiction as we perceive it because they have no theoretical interest in the subject and those situations in which they express their belief in witchcraft do not force the problem upon them" (1937, 25) . Hence, the Azande's attitude in this particular case is in fact compatible with their acceptance of modus ponens in general, i.e. in most other cases. Hence, it cannot be appealed to to claim that they have a different logic from ours.
A similar remark would be apposite also in the case of Catholics' acceptance of certain dogmas, such as the dogma of the Holy Trinity, which goes against the hinge that something can't be one and three things at once. Now, I think we would resist the idea that Catholics have a different logic than ours and that we would rather say that certain issues remain insulated from the employment of logic. In relation to such dogmas and in a similar spirit, Wittgenstein writes: [Catholic] dogma is expressed in the form of an assertion, and is unshakable, but at the same time any practical opinion can be made to harmonize with it; admittedly more easily in some cases than in others.
It is not a wall setting limits to what can be believed, but more like a brake which, however, practically serves the same purpose; it's almost as though someone were to attach a weight to your foot to restrict your freedom of movement. This is how dogma becomes irrefutable and beyond the reach of attack. (CV, 28).
Here Wittgenstein is actually saying that when it gets to Catholic dogmas subjects who believe in them aren't free to apply logic and their usual epistemic methods, despite their behaviour in everyday life. Still, the two spheres -the religious and the mundane one -are sufficiently insulated from one another not to give rise to problems.
13
Be that as it may, Boghossian lists Wittgenstein among those who would have been sympathetic to the relativistic claim that the Azande have a different logic from ours (cf. Boghossian 2006, 70-2, 108-9) . But, in fact, more recent studies (cf. Bloor 1976, 123-30) have shown that a mistake was made in translating them. For they actually believe that only those sons of a witch-doctor who are "hot", and thus not only have the potential for being witch-doctors but actually realise it, are witchdoctors. That's why the Azande may perfectly rationally deny that a witch-doctor's son, who happens to be "cold", is a healer, despite the fact that he has the witchcraft substance in his belly.
Remarkably, however, the conclusion that we should revise our translation is exactly the one Wittgenstein reaches in the case he actually discusses and that Boghossian quotes (2006, 108-9) , without noticing that it is in keeping with his own opposition to epistemic relativism, viz. the case of a community of people who "sell timber by cubic measure" (RFM 148, cf. 143). In such a case, we would have a different epistemic method, where quantities are measured in an odd way and prices are determined differently.
How could we show them that -as I should say -you don't really buy more wood if you buy a pile covering a bigger area? -I should, for instance, take a pile which was small by their ideas and, by laying logs around, change it into a "big" one. This might convince them -but perhaps they would say: "Yes, now it's a lot of wood and costs more" -and that would be the end of the matter. -We should presumably say in this case: they simply do not mean the same by "a lot of wood" and "a little wood" as we do; and they have a quite different system of payment from us. (RFM 150).
So Wittgenstein seems to be saying that we can imagine such a community, whose way of measuring and paying for wood is different from ours. But clearly he thinks that if we had to deal with them, we would try to convince them to measure wood by weight and to pay for it accordingly, by using an entirely rational procedure, viz. by showing them that the quantity of wood remains the same although its area and volume are changed. If that succeeded, the case just presented wouldn't constitute a case of an alternative epistemic method, but, rather, a case in which people hold a false belief, which leads them to using an unreliable procedure to measure (and pay for) wood.
14 In contrast, if rational persuasion failed, Wittgenstein suggests that we should suppose that they don't mean what we do by "a lot of wood" and "a little wood". Hence, we should conclude that we have made a mistake in translating (even homophonically) those people's words with what we mean by "a lot of wood". We should then revise our translation because we can't go against the hinge that one thing -a certain amount of wood -is identical to itself, no matter how we arrange it. Hence, Wittgenstein turns out to be in complete agreement with Boghossian in thinking that just by conceiving of a possibly different community, which is recalcitrant to rational persuasion, we wouldn't have discovered ipso facto a different epistemic system alternative to ours.
Mythology
With respect to "mythology", Wittgenstein writes:
The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rule.
The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is no sharp division of the one from the other. (OC 95, 97).
One, negative claim is clear: Wittgenstein is not saying that our world-picture is something foolish and mistaken, like Homer's gods, which could coexist with other, possibly different ones and be abandoned should we convert to another one. As he writes elsewhere:
It is true that we can compare a picture that is firmly rooted in us [paradigmatically, our world-picture] to a superstition; but it is equally true that we always eventually have to reach some firm ground, either a picture or something else, so that a picture which is at the root of all our thinking is to be respected and not treated as superstition. (CV, 83) Still, it is much more difficult to understand what Wittgenstein is actually, positively saying here.
For one thing, any mythology is discursive -a logos about the mythos -, while here Wittgenstein is insisting on the fact that we have acquired our world-picture silently by playing the game, without 15 being given any explicit rules. Moreover, at various places, he insists that in our everyday lives we almost never mention the propositions that would put our world-picture into words. Rather, it is only when we do philosophy that we actually say, or even find out the propositions he thinks describe our world-picture (OC 332, 350, 467) . So, in effect, by "mythology" Wittgenstein means those propositions that describe our world-picture and that we "discover" by doing philosophy. Now, "bad" philosophy would lead, according to him, to the production of a "philosophical" mythology -11 to thinking, with Moore, that these propositions can actually function as the final grounds of our knowledge, which can be used to oppose scepticism. Whereas "good" philosophy, in
Wittgenstein's opinion, would lead us to seeing that these are the ungrounded presuppositions of our language-games and epistemic practices which can't sensibly be called into doubt as this would deprive us of those practices and, with them, of the possibility of distinguishing between what is warranted and unwarranted, rational and not rational. It is therefore philosophy (as done by Wittgenstein and as opposed to Moore and a sceptic) which allows us to put into words -in a logos -and properly understand what -like any mythos -is actually fundamental to our own picture of the world: that we believe in a universe populated by physical objects and in the uniformity of nature; that 2 + 2 = 4; that the Earth has existed for a long time, etc. Hence, far from holding the view that our world-picture is a superstition, which could be abandoned, leaving everything else as it is, Wittgenstein is in fact suggesting the opposite. Namely: that we have one, shared worldpicture, whose fundamental tenets can be made explicit and are actually described in doing philosophy and whose real role and function only "good" philosophy would be able to appreciate.
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Of course this world-picture may evolve -that is, partially change -over time, as we saw before.
But, interestingly, it would remain one. So, in effect, all Wittgenstein is saying is that our worldpicture is plastic and dynamic, yet unique.
11 On the different uses of "mythology" in Wittgenstein, see Coliva (2003, 172-7) .
12 In Wittgenstein's opinion they would serve partly as rules of evidential significance and partly as meaning constitutive stipulations.
So far I have been arguing that there is room to interpret Wittgenstein as an "internal rationalist" and that the idea of different actually existing, yet equally valid systems of justification is less easy to motivate than it seems at first sight, also in Wittgenstein's own view. Hence, we can conclude that he wasn't a factual epistemic relativist.
Was Wittgenstein a virtual relativist?
In order to assess whether Wittgenstein was a virtual relativist, we need to consider what he maintained about the possibility of having, at least in principle, different yet perfectly legitimate and intelligible world-pictures. 13 Undoubtedly, Wittgenstein repeatedly imagined different communities, in which hinges we take for granted seem not to be held fast. The example of the community that measures wood by the area is clearly a case in point. The conceivability of these communities would then appear to support Wittgenstein's virtual relativism -the idea that it is conceivable that there could be people with altogether different world-pictures and, consequently, conceptual schemes. Hence, the issue of whether Wittgenstein was a virtual epistemic relativist connects with the problem of whether he was a conceptual relativist. Conceptual relativism, in turn, can be defined as the view that it is possible that there be different conceptual schemes, which would return incompatible descriptions of the world, none of which is intrinsically correct, and yet which are intelligibly describable from a theorist's point of view. 14 Had one to chose among them, the choice couldn't be based on the fact that one scheme would be more true to the facts than the other 13 While there are scholars like Marconi (1987, 128) , who wholeheartedly support the view that Wittgenstein was a virtual relativist, others, like Stroud (1965) , deny it. The latter develops his position in opposition to Dummett's (1959) radically conventionalist reading of Wittgenstein's notes in the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics.
Dummett's reading is now generally in disrepute and, at any rate, could hardly carry over to On Certainty, where there is little room for conventionalism.
14 Cf. Glock (2007, 392) : "Whistling in the dark, as Quine remarks somewhere, is not the proper method in philosophy.
Conceptual relativism would be supremely toothless if it amounted to the claim that we cannot exclude the possibility of alternative conceptual schemes which, ex hypothesis, remain forever unrecognisable".
ones, but only on pragmatic and even aesthetic reasons, if not entirely on sociological ones. 15 However, Wittgenstein seems also to suggest that if we failed to persuade them of their mistake, we should revise our translation: the seeming refusal to correct themselves would cast doubt on the fact that they actually mean what we do by the words they use. Conversely, the meaning of a word seems to be a function of at least some central inferences we accept. Hence, did it turn out that, by our lights, the latter aren't accepted, we should conclude that, in fact, their words have a different meaning than the one we first attributed to them. Thus, according to Wittgenstein, radically different epistemic practices wouldn't really be conceivable, just as Barry Stroud maintains.
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Whenever we might be led to thinking otherwise, we should conclude that we have misunderstood them, because they don't actually mean what we do by, e.g. "a lot of wood". Yet, it remains that Wittgenstein repeatedly asked us to imagine these different communities. Was he utterly incoherent? How could he escape this dilemma?
Family resemblance?
Before addressing this impasse, let me consider a suggestion made by Diego Marconi (1987, 132-3) in order to defuse it. He thinks that it would be complicated to make sense of a radically different 15 This characterisation of conceptual relativism draws on my 2009a. It partially overlaps with Glock's (2007, 381-2 ).
An oft-mentioned example in favour of relativism is Putnam's case (1990, 96) of the two communities which describe a little world composed of the circles x, y, z either as a world populated by three objects, or by seven (mereological) ones.
As Boghossian (2006, 36-7) remarks, however, the two descriptions aren't really incompatible, for there is no inconsistency between saying that in a world there are three objects or seven, if in the two descriptions the word "object" means "individual" and "mereological object" respectively. (Similar considerations can be advanced against other alleged instances of conceptual relativism presented in Glock 2007, 394) . Nor is it enough, in order to rank Wittgenstein among conceptual relativists, simply to point out that he believed that grammar is arbitrary, as opposed to what Glock (2007, 382) maintains. For that by itself doesn't license the conclusion that different and incompatible conceptual schemes would be intelligible. Taken as such, the idea that grammar is arbitrary merely hints at the view that our language and therefore, in a Wittgensteinian perspective, our concepts are not grounded in a "putative essence or form of reality, and that [they] cannot be correct or incorrect in a philosophically relevant way" (ivi).
16 See also Zettel (350) and Broyles (1974) . community for whom a given quantity of wood changes depending on how it is spatially arranged, because we would have to make a lot of other adjustments to let them turn out to be coherent; yet, we could extend our concepts through family resemblance. Hence, "little wood" or "a lot of wood" would mean something only slightly different from what we mean by those words, which we could understand by analogy with what we mean.
Though ingenious, I don't find this suggestion convincing. The notion of family resemblance explains how we apply our concepts to cases that don't present a definite set of common features, so long as we can find some analogy between them and something else which we regard as an instance of the concept. Now, the problem is that since the examples are under-described, we simply don't know if we could find those analogies which would allow us to apply the idea of family resemblance. But, in general, there seem to be only two options: if, in the other areas, their use of the relevant words is like ours, we would think that when it comes to measuring wood, they mean exactly what we do and simply have wrong beliefs. Hence, this community wouldn't present a conceptual and an epistemic system that are real alternatives to ours. If, in contrast, in those other areas there were substantial differences, we couldn't find the "intermediate steps" we need in order to understand their use of those words as just partially different from, yet intertwined with ours.
One may protest that I have been unfair to Marconi's suggestion regarding the first horn: if a difference were sufficiently local, it could still be taken to be a partial conceptual difference, which we would understand thanks to its family resemblance with our concepts. But we need to be careful here: if they mean something only slightly different from what we mean by "there is a lot of wood", then we can't really translate them with those words. To see why, consider the following case: we may try to translate the Portuguese word "saudade" with "nostalgia". But this isn't really what "saudade" means, as many Portuguese would confirm. Nor is it the case that through an enormous amount of empathy non-Portuguese could understand what saudade is about, while acknowledging the lack of words that could translate it into their own language. What we should admit rather is that, if saudade is really anything at all over and above nostalgia, we don't truly know what it is (or what "saudade" means). Hence, should we have to translate that word, we probably had better borrow the Portuguese expression itself adding a partly explanatory footnote, which could give an idea of the semantic area in which that word should be located. Thus, family resemblance can't help us preserve conceptual differences while making them really intelligible. Insofar as these differences persist, they remain unbridgeable, at least at bottom.
On reflection, however, this should come as no surprise. For family resemblance is an explanation of how our concepts work and of how we can extend them to new cases. Here, however, we weren't trying to extend our concept of nostalgia to comprise also cases of saudade; rather, we were trying to use our own concept -just as it is -in an attempt to get to grips with that of saudade, while maintaining their difference. That's why the appeal to the idea of family resemblance couldn't help us in the end: insofar as it works, it abolishes the differences by partially transforming the original concept. Hence, if differences have to be preserved, as relativism requires, the idea of family resemblance can't be applied (cf. Winch 1964, 33) .
Another suggestion may be as follows: suppose that this community just uses wood to cover areas, as it might happen if they only employed it to make floors. So, if they were presented with one single log of weight x, given their purposes, it would be less wood than if they were presented with two juxtaposed logs amounting to the same weight. This, however, wouldn't be enough to conclude that they have a different epistemic practice of measuring (and paying for) wood. At least not insofar as they were prepared to agree that the weight and hence the quantity of wood remains the same and thus to say: "Of course we can see that the weight is the same, still, in the second case there is more wood". Nor would this be enough to conclude that their concept of more (wood) and its cognates is different from ours (as Marconi seems to suggest and relativism requires). For what they really mean when they say "There is more wood here" is simply "There is a bigger area of wood here", and obviously, given their purposes, they are prepared to pay more for it, as it allows 20 them to cover a bigger extension. Hence, everything else being equal, we should accordingly revise our translation. Indeed if the only thing they do with wood is to cover areas, then it is obvious why they don't disambiguate between the weight of wood and the area it covers and hence why they keep using the same words they employ in connection with quantities of ice-cream and flour, which they measure by their weight, just as we do. Thus, we haven't found any clear sense in which thinking of this deviant community should force us to admit that they have either a different epistemic practice or a different concept of a lot (and its cognates). All they have is, at most, a language where, for the reasons just explained, they don't need to distinguish between weight and areas covered by wood and can thus use the words "a lot of" and their cognates across different language-games in these apparently irreconcilable ways.
But let us go back to Marconi's suggestion. Another reason why the notion of family resemblance wouldn't help us make sense of the deviant community is that if we tried to extend our concept of a lot to comprise their use of it in connection with wood, on the assumption that they really meant "a lot" as we do, we would introduce a contradiction between the use of that concept with respect to, e.g. ice-cream and flour, on the one hand, and in connection with wood, on the other. The notion of family resemblance, in contrast, explains the functioning of our concepts and the possibility of applying them to new cases, only when such inclusions do not introduce overt contradictions. 17 Thus, the suggestion that we may really understand Wittgenstein's imagined communities, while maintaining the differences between us and them, by mobilising the notion of family resemblance, is spurious: if differences are local, we would regard their use either as a mistaken application of the same concepts we use, or as a use of a different concept, which would call for a more careful translation of their words; or else, as the use of a different concept, which, however, we can't quite grasp, in such a way that we would end up not finding them intelligible, or to find them only partially intelligible but on the background of a largely similar conceptual scheme. If, in contrast, differences between our use and theirs aren't local, we couldn't really make sense of such a 17 Even Winch (1964, 30) emphasises that possible extensions have to be intelligible in light of previous uses.
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community and, insofar as we may want or need to interpret them, we would have to revise our translations altogether, in such a way as to re-establish widespread agreement.
Alternative world-pictures as mere metaphysical possibilities: on the ungroundedness and yet universality of our own world-picture Our dilemma was: how could Wittgenstein both ask us to imagine allegedly radically different communities and maintain that, if we tried to think them through, we couldn't really make sense of them and should thus revise our translations? Or, to put it differently, if these radically different communities aren't really conceivable from our own point of view -which, after all, is the only one we've got -what is left to the idea that, at least in principle, there might be possibly different communities, with their own epistemic systems and conceptual schemes?
All it seems left to this idea is the purely metaphysical possibility 18 that if certain "facts of nature" (PI II, xii) had been totally different, or if "something really unheard of" (OC 513) were to happen, there could be creatures who don't believe in the existence of material objects, who don't reason as we do, for whom 2+2 isn't equal to 4, who don't use their senses to gather evidence, who don't think that the Earth has existed for a long time before they were born, etc. Hence, all it remains to it is the metaphysical possibility that all this might happen, or might have been the case. Still it is a possibility that we can't really conceive of in detail, given the kind of creatures we are and the fact that our concepts are what they are also because of some very general facts about us and about nature. That is to say, our own way of thinking, when applied to the task of imagining substantially different communities, works in such a way that it screens them off, by suggesting the various verdicts, adjustments and revisions we have been seeing. Notice, however, that this wouldn't be a form of virtual relativism. For virtual relativism requires that radically different world-pictures were at least conceivable, that is to say, imaginable in detail and understandable from the point of view of those who are conceiving them. If the preceding is 18 See also Broyles (1974 The value of what in the end appears to be an entirely notional exercise is, I believe, to make us aware of the ungroundedness of our own world-picture -that is to say, of its contingency.
20
Hence, the point of this exercise in imagination is not to prove that altogether different world-pictures are really conceivable, but to make us better aware of the ungroundedness of the only world-picture we have and can mobilise to understand apparent and, when really conceivable, merely local departures from it. At a reflexive level, moreover, this exercise teaches us something about our own way of thinking, namely that it doesn't screen off the metaphysical possibility that there might be radically alternative world-pictures, but, rather, their conceivability in detail from our own point of view. This, in turn, entails that even if they existed, we wouldn't be able to recognise them as such, because if we got so far as to be in a position to interpret them, we would inevitably do so by the lights of our own world-picture and conceptual scheme. Thus, our world-picture and conceptual scheme may well be metaphysically contingent, still they are unavoidable for us and, therefore, universal, if only from our own point of view.
If so, a negative answer must be returned to the question "Was Wittgenstein a virtual epistemic relativist?". Since, however, we haven't found any decisive evidence that Wittgenstein was a factual epistemic relativist either, we must return a negative answer also to the general question of whether he was an epistemic relativist at all. All he was, it seems, is simply an anti-foundationalist. That is to say, he believed that we have just one world-picture; that, in principle, it could have been 19 In PI II, xii, for instance, he writes that if one imagines that certain facts of nature were different from what they are, "the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him" (italics mine). I think that here 
